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Inflation targeting has become an increasingly popular approach 
to the conduct of monetary policy worldwide since the early 1990s. 
Most of the countries that have adopted inflation targeting judge 
the experiment favorably, at least thus far. In many countries, the 
adoption of inflation targeting has been associated with reductions 
in both the average level and the volatility of inflation. Inflation 
targeting has been especially successful in stabilizing inflation 
expectations.1 This stems from inflation-targeting central banks’ 
emphasis on a clear medium-term commitment for inflation (while 
temporary departures from the inflation target are allowed) and their 
increased communication with regard to the outlook for inflation over 
the next few years.
This approach to monetary policy, however, may not be equally 
suitable for all countries, regardless of their existing institutions, the 
disturbances to which their economy is subject, and the other policies 
pursued by the government. One question worthy of discussion is 
how a country’s fiscal policies might affect the suitability of inflation 
targeting as an approach to the conduct of monetary policy.
The theoretical literature that develops the case for inflation 
targeting largely neglects the fiscal consequences of a commitment to 
 We thank Rómulo Chumacero, Norman Loayza, Eduardo Loyo, and Klaus Schmidt-
Hebbel for useful comments on an earlier draft, Vasco Curdia and Mauro Roca for 
research assistance, and the National Science Foundation for research support.
1. Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) compare inflation expectations in inflation-
targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries. 
Monetary Policy under Inflation Targeting, edited by Frederic Mishkin and 
Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Santiago, Chile. © 2007 Central Bank of Chile.
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an inflation target.2 The models used to analyze monetary stabilization 
policy usually abstract from the government’s budget and the 
dynamics of the public debt, so that any fiscal effects of monetary 
policy decisions are tacitly assumed to be irrelevant. This may be an 
acceptable simplification if one is choosing a policy for an economy with 
sound government finances, by which we mean one with relatively 
nondistorting sources of revenue and an unquestionable political will to 
maintain government solvency. The degree to which such an idealization 
of the circumstances of fiscal policy is realistic varies across countries. 
As inflation targeting becomes popular in developing countries that 
have recently had serious problems with inflation precisely because of 
their precarious government finances, one may wonder how safe it is to 
ignore the interrelation between monetary and fiscal policy choices.
A number of authors suggest that the appropriateness of inflation 
targeting as a policy recommendation may depend critically on the 
nature of fiscal policy. For example, Fraga, Goldfajn, and Minella 
(2004), in their discussion of inflation targeting for developing 
countries, remark that
“...the success of inflation targeting (...) requires the absence of fiscal 
dominance” (p. 383).
They go on to stress that not only must fiscal policy be sound 
in this respect, but its continued soundness must be credible. Their 
intent is not to suggest developing countries ought not adopt inflation 
targeting, but rather to emphasize the importance of enacting credible 
fiscal reforms, as well. Nevertheless, their insistence on the need for 
fiscal commitments that are not obviously present in many developing 
countries raises the question of whether inflation targeting is ill-
advised in such countries.
Sims (2005) enunciates exactly this view. He argues that some 
countries’ fiscal policies may make the achievement of a target rate 
of inflation by the central bank impossible, in the sense that there 
is no possible rational-expectations equilibrium in which the target 
is fulfilled, regardless of the conduct of monetary policy. He further 
asserts that in such a case, attempting to target inflation may not 
only be doomed to frustration, but could even be harmful, by leading 
to less stability (even less stability of the inflation rate) than might 
2. See, for example, King (1997), Svensson (1997, 1999, 2003), Woodford (2003, 
chaps. 7–8), Walsh (2003, chap. 11), or Svensson and Woodford (2005) for the theoretical 
case for some version of inflation targeting as an optimal policy.
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have been achieved through other policies. His essential argument is 
that if the fiscal regime ensures that primary budget surpluses are not 
(sufficiently) increased in response to a monetary tightening, then a 
policy intended to contain inflation—namely, raising nominal interest 
rates sharply when inflation rises above the inflation target—may 
cause an explosion of the public debt, which ultimately requires even 
larger price increases than would have been necessary had the debt 
not grown. Loyo (1999) and Blanchard (2005) provide examples of 
models in which “orthodox” monetary policies of this kind lead to 
explosive debt dynamics. 
Our goal in this paper is to analyze the character of an optimal 
monetary policy commitment under alternative assumptions about the 
character of fiscal policy, in order to determine the conditions under 
which an optimal policy will be similar to inflation targeting and the 
extent to which the form of an optimal monetary policy rule depends 
on the nature of fiscal policy. To address these issues, we extend the 
framework used to analyze optimal monetary stabilization policy in 
Benigno and Woodford (2005a), which allows us to explicitly model debt 
dynamics and the conditions required for intertemporal government 
solvency and also to treat the effects of tax distortions. We consider a 
variety of assumptions regarding the character of fiscal policy, including 
the kind of fiscal regime—under which the real primary budget surplus 
is not adjusted to prevent explosion of the public debt as a result of an 
interest rate hike—that is at the heart of the Loyo (1999) and Blanchard 
(2005) examples of possible perverse effects of tight-money policies.
1. A MODEL WITH NONTRIVIAL MONETARY AND FISCAL 
POLICY CHOICES
We use a standard new Keynesian model of the trade-offs involved 
in monetary stabilization policy, augmented to take account of tax 
distortions.3
1.1 The Model
The goal of policy is assumed to be the maximization of the level 
of expected utility of a representative household. In our model, each 
household seeks to maximize
3. Further details of the derivation of the structural equations of our model of 
nominal price rigidity can be found in Woodford (2003, chap. 3).
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with an elasticity of substitution equal to θ > 1, and Ht(j) is the quantity 
supplied of labor of type j. Each differentiated good is supplied by a 
single monopolistically competitive producer. We assume that there 
are many goods in each of an infinite number of industries; the goods 
in each industry, j, are produced using a type of labor that is specific to 
that industry, and their prices are also changed at the same time. The 
representative household supplies all types of labor and consumes all 
types of goods. To simplify the algebraic form of our results, we restrict 
attention in this paper to the case of isoelastic functional forms,
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where σ ν, > 0 and { Ct , Ht } are bounded exogenous disturbance 
processes. (We use the notation ξt to refer to the complete vector of 
exogenous disturbances, includingCt and Ht .) 
We assume a common technology for the production of all goods, 
in which (industry-specific) labor is the only variable input,
y i A f h i A h it t t t t( )= ( )( )= ( )
1 φ
, 
where At is an exogenously varying technology factor, and φ > 1. 
We invert the production function to write the demand for each 
type of labor as a function of the quantities produced of the various 
differentiated goods, and we use the identity
Y C Gt t t= +
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to substitute for Ct, where Gt is exogenous government demand for the 
composite good. We can then write the utility of the representative 
household as a function of the expected production plan, {yt(i)}.
4
The producers in each industry fix the prices of their goods in 
monetary units for a random interval of time, as in the model of 
staggered pricing introduced by Calvo (1983). We let 0 ≤ α < 1 be the 
fraction of prices that remain unchanged in any period. A supplier that 
changes its price in period t chooses its new price pt(i) to maximize
E Q p i p P Yt
T t
T t
t T t T
j
T T Tα τ
−
=
∞
∑ ()( )








, , , ; , ,Π ξT ,                                              (3)
where Qt,T is the stochastic discount factor by which financial markets 
discount random nominal income in period T to determine the nominal 
value of a claim to such income in period t, and αT–t is the probability 
that a price chosen in period t will not have been revised by period T. 
In equilibrium, this discount factor is given by
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indicates the after-tax nominal profits of a supplier with price p, in an 
industry with common price pj, when the aggregate price index is equal 
to P, aggregate demand is equal to Y, and sales revenues are taxed at 
rate τ. Profits are equal to after-tax sales revenues net of the wage bill. 
The real wage demanded for labor of type j is assumed to be given by 
an exogenous markup factor µt
w  (which is allowed to vary over time, 
but is assumed common to all labor markets) times the marginal rate 
4. We assume that the government needs to obtain an exogenously given quantity of 
the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate in each period, in a cost-minimizing fashion. The government 
thus allocates its purchases across the suppliers of differentiated goods in the same 
proportion as do households, and the index of aggregate demand, Yt, is the same function 
of the individual quantities, {yt(i)}, as Ct is of the individual quantities consumed, {ct(i)}, 
defined in equation (2). 
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of substitution between work of type j and consumption, and firms are 
assumed to be wage takers. We allow for wage markup variations in 
order to include the possibility of a pure cost-push shock that affects 
equilibrium pricing behavior while implying no change in the efficient 
allocation of resources. Variation in the tax rate, τt, has a similar effect 
on this pricing problem (and hence on supply behavior), so when the 
evolution of the tax rate is treated as an exogenous political constraint, 
variations in the tax rate also act as pure cost-push shocks.
We abstract here from any monetary frictions that would account 
for a demand for central bank liabilities that earn a substandard rate 
of return; we nonetheless assume that the central bank can control the 
riskless short-term nominal interest rate it.
5 This, in turn, is related 
to other financial asset prices through the arbitrage relation,
1 1
1+ = ( )+
−
i E Qt t t t, .                                                                            (5) 
We assume that the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates 
never binds under the optimal policies considered below. We therefore 
do not need to introduce any additional constraints on the possible paths 
of output and prices associated with the need for the chosen evolution 
of prices to be consistent with a nonnegative nominal interest rate. 
Our abstraction from monetary frictions, and hence from the 
existence of seignorage revenues, does not mean that monetary 
policy has no fiscal consequences, since interest rate policy and the 
equilibrium inflation that results from it have implications for the 
real burden of government debt. In our baseline analysis, we assume 
that all public debt consists of riskless nominal one-period bonds.6 The 
nominal value, Bt, of end-of-period public debt then evolves according 
to a law of motion,
B i B P st t t t t= +( ) −− −1 1 1 ,                                                                    (6)
where the real primary budget surplus is given by
s Y Gt t t t t≡ − −τ ζ ,                                                                              (7) 
where ζt represents the real value of (lump-sum) government transfers. 
Rational-expectations equilibrium requires that the expected path 
5. For a discussion of how this is possible even in a cashless economy of the kind 
assumed here, see Woodford (2003, chap. 2).
6. The consequences of longer-maturity public debt are discussed in section 3.3.
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of government surpluses must satisfy an intertemporal solvency 
condition,
b
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in each state of the world that may be realized at date t, where 
Rt,T ≡ Qt,TPT/Pt is the stochastic discount factor for a real income 
stream.
We consider alternative assumptions about the degree of 
endogeneity of the various contributions to the government budget 
in equation (7). In the conventional literature on optimal monetary 
stabilization policy, both Gt and τt are exogenous processes (among the 
real disturbances to which monetary policy may respond), but ζt can be 
adjusted endogenously to ensure intertemporal solvency in a way that 
creates no deadweight loss, so that the fiscal consequences of monetary 
policy are not significant for welfare. We also consider a more realistic 
case in which Gt and ζt are exogenous disturbances, and additional 
government revenue has a positive shadow value, but τt can be varied 
endogenously to minimize deadweight loss. In the most constrained 
case, where the concerns stressed by Sims (2005) arise, Gt, τt, and ζt 
are all exogenous processes determined by political constraints.
1.2 An Associated Linear-Quadratic Policy Problem
We approximate the solution to our optimal policy problem by the 
solution to an associated linear-quadratic (LQ) problem; the derivation 
of the approximations is presented in detail in Benigno and Woodford 
(2004). We show that we can define an LQ problem with the property 
that the solution to the LQ problem is a linear approximation to 
optimal policy in the exact model when the exogenous disturbances 
are small enough.
First, we show that maximization of expected utility is (locally) 
equivalent to minimization of a discounted loss function of the form
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where the target output level, Y t
*
, is a function of exogenous 
disturbances. If steady-state tax distortions are not too extreme, then 
qy, qπ > 0 and the loss function is convex, as assumed in conventional 
accounts of the goals of monetary stabilization policy.
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The constraints on possible equilibrium outcomes are given by 
log-linear approximations to the structural equations of the model 
described above. Here we omit derivations and proceed directly to the 
log-linear forms. First, there is an aggregate supply relation between 
current inflation and real activity,
π κ ψτ β πt t t t t tY c E= + + ′





+ +ˆ ˆ ξξ 1 ,                                                    (10)
where κ, ψ > 0. This is the familiar new Keynesian Phillips curve, 
augmented to include the cost-push effects of variations in the sales 
tax. We can write the constraint in terms of the welfare-relevant 
output gap, 
y Y Yt t t≡ − 
*
, 
in which case equation (10) becomes 
π κ ψτ β πt t t t t ty u E= + +( )+ + 1 , 
where ut is a composite cost-push term associated with exogenous 
disturbances other than variations in the tax rate.7 In other words, 
π κ ψ τ τ β πt t t t t ty E= + −
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where τ t
*  is a function of exogenous disturbances that indicates the 
tax change needed to offset the other cost-push terms.
Another constraint on the possible equilibrium paths of inflation, 
output, and tax rates is the condition for intertemporal government 
solvency (equation 8).8 A log-linear approximation to equation (8) 
takes the form
7. An obvious source of such disturbances would be variations in the wage 
markup, µt
w . This is the only source of variations in ut when the steady-state involves 
no distortions. In the case of a distorted steady state, however, most other kinds of real 
disturbances also have cost-push effects (as shown in Benigno and Woodford, 2004), 
since they do not move the flexible-price equilibrium level of output to precisely the 
same extent (in percentage terms) as they move the efficient level of output. The latter 
sources of cost-push terms become more important as the magnitude of the steady-state 
distortions increases.
8. This does not amount to requiring that fiscal policy be Ricardian; we consider below 
the consequences of non-Ricardian fiscal policies of the kind assumed in the warnings 
of Sims (2005). Instead, equation (8) is a condition that must hold in equilibrium under 
any policy, and it constrains the possible outcomes that can be achieved in determining 
the best equilibrium under certain constraints on possible policies.
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where ft is a composite of the various exogenous disturbances that we 
refer to as fiscal stress. We have written the constraint in terms of 
the output gap and the tax gap, τ τ T T−
* , which indicates departures 
of the tax rate from the level consistent with complete stabilization 
of both inflation and the output gap. Therefore, the term ft (or, more 
precisely, the sum b t–1 + ft) measures the extent to which intertemporal 
solvency prevents complete achievement of the stabilization goals 
represented in equation (9). 
Here we have substituted equation (4) for the stochastic discount 
factor (and replaced Ct by Yt – Gt) to obtain a relation that involves only 
the initial public debt and the paths of inflation, output, taxes, and the 
various exogenous variables. The effects of interest rate policy on debt 
dynamics are the key to the scenarios of Loyo, 1999, and Blanchard, 
2005, under which tight money can be inflationary. We take these effects 
into account through the presence of the stochastic discount factor in 
equation (8), which is linked to the interest rate controlled by the central 
bank through equation (5). Interest rates do not appear in equation (12) 
because we have already substituted for them using the connection 
between interest rates and the paths of output and inflation that must 
hold in equilibrium, but the effect of tight money on the burden of the 
public debt is nonetheless taken into account in this equation.
In writing equation (12) in the form given, we have treated ζt (real 
net transfers) as one of the exogenous disturbances that affects the 
fiscal stress term. For the case in which net transfers are endogenous 
and can be varied to ensure solvency, we need to separate out the 
ζt term from the other (exogenous) determinants of ft. The solvency 
constraint ceases to bind, however, given that the level of transfers 
affects neither the aggregate supply trade-off (equation 11) nor the 
loss function (equation 9), so that policymakers are free to vary ζt as 
necessary to satisfy equation (12). Thus we do not need to write the 
solvency constraint, except for the case in which ζt is exogenous.
2. OPTIMAL INFLATION TARGETING: THE CONVENTIONAL 
ANALYSIS
We begin by using the framework sketched in the previous section 
to recapitulate well-known arguments for a form of flexible inflation 
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targeting as a way of implementing an optimal state-contingent 
monetary policy, highlighting the role of (often tacit) assumptions 
about fiscal policy in deriving these familiar results.9 The conventional 
analysis of optimal monetary stabilization policy in a new Keynesian 
model corresponds to the case of the above model in which the processes 
{Gt, τt} are both exogenously given as political constraints on what 
policy can achieve, while the level of net lump-sum transfers, ζt, is an 
endogenous policy variable (along with the short-term nominal interest 
rate). When lump-sum transfers can be chosen to facilitate stabilization 
policy, the intertemporal solvency constraint ceases to bind, and it can 
be omitted from our description of the policy problem. We can similarly 
omit any reference to the path of the public debt. Moreover, when the 
level of distorting taxes is given exogenously, we can treat the τ t term 
in equation (10) the same as the other cost-push terms.
The problem of optimal stabilization policy is then simply to 
find paths {πt, yt} to minimize equation (9) subject to the single 
constraint,
π κ β πt t t t ty u E= +( )+ +1 ,                                                                  (13) 
where the definition of ut is now modified to include the cost-push 
effects of variations in τt (if these are present). This is the optimal 
policy problem treated, for example, in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 
(1999). Here we emphasize how this conception of the goals of monetary 
stabilization policy provides an argument for inflation targeting.
A first, simple conclusion about optimal policy under these 
assumptions is that in the absence of cost-push disturbances, 
optimal policy would involve adjusting interest rates as necessary to 
maintain zero inflation at all times. This is easily seen from the fact 
that if ut = 0 at all times, equation (13) is consistent with maintaining 
both a zero inflation rate and a zero output gap at all times, and such 
an outcome obviously minimizes the loss function (equation 9).
This provides one argument for inflation targeting: if cost-push 
shocks are unimportant (because distortions from market power and 
taxes are both small, on average, and fairly stable over time), then 
a low, stable inflation rate is optimal, regardless of the degree of 
variability in real activity that this may entail (owing to the effects 
9. See, for example, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999), Svensson (2003), Woodford 
(2003, chaps. 7–8; 2004), or Svensson and Woodford (2005) for more detailed 
presentations of the arguments summarized here.
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of preference and technology disturbances on Yt*). It also implies 
something of more general validity: even when random cost-push 
shocks of substantial magnitude do occur, optimal policy should 
involve zero inflation, on average. (This follows from the previous 
result using the certainty-equivalence property of linear- quadratic 
optimization problems.)10 The optimal long-run inflation target is 
thus quite low (zero, in our simple model), regardless of the degree 
of distortions in the economy or the degree to which the optimal 
output level may exceed the level associated with stable prices. Given 
that any departures from this constant long-run average inflation 
rate stemming from cost-push shocks should be transitory, expected 
inflation in the medium term should always be near zero. Therefore, 
our result justifies a policy that seeks to maintain low and stable 
medium-term inflation expectations, as at least one criterion that 
an optimal policy should satisfy.
The conception of optimal stabilization policy just proposed 
provides an important reason for a central bank to commit itself 
to an explicit target for inflation, rather than for other variables 
(such as real activity), even when cost-push shocks are expected to be 
nontrivial. In the optimal control of a forward-looking system—the 
kind of problem just posed above—the advance commitment of 
policy generally offers advantages by influencing expectations at 
earlier dates in a way that improves the available stabilization 
outcomes at those dates. But what aspect of future expectations 
matter? When the only constraint on what policy can achieve 
is the aggregate supply relation (equation 13), the only aspect 
of future expectations that affects the inflation and output gap 
that can be achieved in some period t is expectations regarding 
future inflation, Etπt+1. Hence, this type of commitment is directly 
relevant: committing to achieve a particular inflation rate in the 
future, which might be different from what would otherwise be 
chosen later to best achieve one’s stabilization goals. Given that 
the role of a policy commitment should be to anchor the public’s 
inflation expectations, a commitment regarding future inflation 
and the central bank’s communication of the outlook for inflation 
are straightforward ways to achieve the benefits associated with 
an optimal policy commitment.
10. See Svensson and Woodford (2003) for a discussion of certainty equivalence 
in the context of policy problems with forward-looking constraints, like the one 
considered here.
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Beyond these general considerations, one can easily characterize 
the optimal state-contingent evolution of prices and quantities under a 
particular assumption about the character of the disturbances affecting 
the economy (though this aspect of our conclusions depends strongly 
on the precise details of our assumed model of the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy). The following first-order conditions 
are associated with the policy problem stated above: 
q t t tππ κ ϕ ϕ= −( )
−
−
1
1
 and                                                                (14)
q yy t t= ϕ ,                                                                                         (15) 
each of which must hold for each t ≥ 0. Here, ϕt is the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the aggregate supply constraint (equation 13). We can 
solve conditions (14) and (15), together with the aggregate supply 
relation (equation 13), for the optimal evolution of {πt, yt} given the 
disturbances {ut}.
The optimal state-contingent responses can be implemented 
through commitment to a constant target for the output-gap-adjusted 
price level:
p p
q
q
yt t
y
t≡ + κ π
,                                                                               (16)
where pt denotes log Pt, as discussed in Woodford (2003, chap. 7). A 
targeting rule of this form determines the optimal trade-off between 
price increase and output decline that should be selected when the 
shock occurs; the policy stance should be neither so tight as to cause 
pt  to decline (as would be required for there to be no increase in prices) 
nor so loose as to allow pt to rise (as would be required for there to be 
no reduction in output relative to target output). At the same time, 
commitment to adhere to such a rule in the future automatically 
implies invariance of the expected long-run price level and output 
gap, and it determines the optimal rate of return of both variables to 
those long-run levels. The output gap should not return to zero too 
quickly (which would allow prices to remain high and so involve an 
increase in the gap-adjusted price level) or too slowly (which would 
cause the gap-adjusted price level to fall once the cost-push disturbance 
had dissipated). Figure 1 provides an example of the optimal impulse 
responses of inflation and the output gap to a purely transitory positive 
cost-push shock (that is, the solution to the first-order conditions listed 
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses to a Transitory Cost-Push 
Shock under Discretionary Policy and an Optimal 
Commitment.
Inflation
Output
Price level
Source: Woodford (2003, chap. 7, fig. 7.3). 
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above in the case of such a disturbance).11 The dynamic paths of the 
log price level and the output gap are perfect mirror images of one 
another, up to scale, so that pt is not allowed to vary.
This is an example of a robustly optimal policy rule in the sense of 
Giannoni and Woodford (2002): commitment to the same target criterion 
is optimal, regardless of the statistical properties of the disturbance 
process. (The optimal dynamic responses shown in figure 1 will be 
different in the case of a shock that is not completely transitory or not 
wholly unexpected when it occurs, but the optimal responses of pt and 
yt will always mirror one another in the way shown in the figure.) The 
first-order conditions of equations (14) and (15) can be used directly to 
show that pt must not change over time under an optimal policy, without 
making any assumptions about the nature of the disturbance.
Such a policy prescription can be viewed as a form of flexible 
inflation targeting, since the requirement that ∆ pt = 0 can 
equivalently be written as
π
κ π
t
y
t
q
q
y+ =∆ 0 . 
In this form, the rule states that the acceptable rate of inflation at 
any point in time should vary depending on the rate of change of the 
output gap. Svensson and Woodford (2005) discuss a more realistic 
version of this prescription, which incorporates delays in the effects 
of monetary policy on spending and prices. Here, we are interested in 
the ways in which this familiar analysis must be complicated under 
alternative assumptions about fiscal policy.
3. OPTIMAL POLICY WHEN ONLY DISTORTING TAXES ARE 
AVAILABLE: THE CASE OF OPTIMAL TAX SMOOTHING 
It is more realistic to assume that lump-sum taxes are not available 
to offset the fiscal consequences of monetary policy decisions. When 
we assume the process {ζt} to be exogenously given, the intertemporal 
solvency condition represents an additional binding constraint on the 
set of possible equilibrium paths for inflation and output. In Benigno 
11. This calculation is further explained in Woodford (2003, chap. 7). The parameter 
values assumed are β = 0.99, κ = 0.024, and qy/qπ = 0.048. The figure also shows, for 
purposes of comparison, the equilibrium responses that would occur under discretionary 
optimization. In this case, the gap-adjusted price level does not change in the period 
of the shock, but it is expected to be allowed to rise subsequently. This expectation 
results in a less favorable inflation-output trade-off for the central bank in the period 
of the shock.
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and Woodford (2004), we consider optimal monetary policy in such an 
environment, under the assumption that the path of the distorting tax 
rate, {τt}, is chosen optimally in response to the various types of real 
disturbances considered in the model. Here we recapitulate the main 
conclusions of that analysis, before turning to cases in which fiscal 
policy is assumed to be less flexible or not optimally determined.
In this case, we view monetary and fiscal policy decisions as being 
jointly determined in a coordinated fashion, so as to solve a single social 
welfare problem. The planning problem is to find state-contingent paths 
{πt, yt, τ t } to minimize equation (9) subject to the two constraints of 
equations (11) and (12). An especially simple version of this problem is 
the limiting case in which prices are perfectly flexible. This case clearly 
illustrates why the absence of lump-sum taxes can make it optimal 
for the inflation rate to be highly responsive to fiscal developments, 
contrary to what inflation targeting is generally assumed to imply. 
Some authors argue that this kind of analysis is relevant to the choice 
of monetary institutions in Latin America (Sims, 2002).
3.1 Optimal Policy If Prices Are Flexible
In the flexible-price limit of the above model, the coefficient qπ in 
equation (9) is equal to zero, and κ in equation (11) is also zero (that 
is, the aggregate supply relation is completely vertical). The policy 
problem reduces to the minimization of
1
2 0
0
0
2q E yy t
t t
t
t t
β −
=
∞
∑ ,                                                                             (17)
subject to the constraints
yt t t+ −





 =ψ τ τ 
* 0                                                                             (18)
and equation (12). Using equation (18) to substitute for yt in equation 
(17) allows us to equivalently write the stabilization objective as
Et
t t
t t
t t
0
0
0
2
β τ τ−
=
∞
−



∑   * , 
in which case the policy objective can be thought of as tax smoothing, 
as in Barro’s (1979) classic analysis.12
12. Thus our stabilization objective (equation 9) does not omit the concerns of the 
literature on optimal tax smoothing; the welfare losses associated with a failure to optimally 
time the collection of taxes are implicit in the output-gap stabilization objective.
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The solution will involve yt = 0 at all times, since it is feasible 
to achieve this if the monetary and fiscal authorities cooperate. 
The fiscal authority must choose τ τ t t=
* at all times to ensure this, 
while the monetary authority must vary the inflation rate, πt, to 
ensure government solvency. Equation (12) requires that in such an 
equilibrium,
πt t tb f= +− 1 .
Thus unexpected changes in the fiscal stress term must be 
accommodated entirely by surprise variations in the inflation rate, 
as in Chari and Kehoe (1999). The tax rate should fluctuate only to 
the extent that τ t
*
fluctuates; that is, only to the extent that variations 
in the tax rate are useful as a supply-side policy, to offset inefficient 
supply disturbances.13
This conclusion implies that an optimal policy will involve highly 
volatile inflation and extreme sensitivity of inflation to fiscal shocks. 
This is the basis of Sims’ (2002) critique of dollarization as a policy 
prescription for Mexico; at least a strict form of inflation targeting 
would presumably be rejected on the same grounds. This analysis, 
however, neglects the welfare costs of volatile inflation, which are 
stressed in the literature on inflation targeting. Here we consider the 
importance of the Chari-Kehoe argument in the presence of a realistic 
degree of price stickiness.
3.2 Optimal Policy If Prices Are Sticky
In the more general case of our model (with some degree of price 
stickiness), the first-order conditions for the optimal policy problem 
stated above are
q t t t t tππ κ ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ= −( )− −( )
−
− −
1
1 1 1 2 2 1, , , , ,                                            (19)
q y by t t y t t= − −( ) +

 +
− −
−ϕ β σ ϕ σ ϕ1
1
2
1
2 11, , , ,                                      (20)
ϕ ϕ2 2 1, ,t t tE= + , and                                                                           (21)
13. As shown in Benigno and Woodford (2004), a wide range of inefficient supply 
disturbances may require such an offset, if the steady state is sufficiently distorted as 
a result of either market power or a large public debt.
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ψϕ β ϕτ1 21, ,t tb= −( ) ,                                                                          (22) 
where now ϕ1,t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
aggregate supply relation and ϕ2,t is the multiplier associated with 
the intertemporal solvency condition. Conditions (19)–(22), together 
with the two structural equations (11) and (12), are to be solved for 
the paths of the endogenous variables, {πt, yt, τ t ,bt , ϕ1,t, ϕ2,t}, given 
an exogenous process for {ft}.
The type of response to shocks implied by these equations can 
be illustrated using a numerical example. We adopt the same 
numerical parameter values as in Benigno and Woodford (2004), 
implying that β = 0.99, σ–1 = 0.157, κ = 0.0236, ψ = 0.397, bτ = 8.33, and 
that the relative weight on output-gap stabilization is qy/qπ = 0.0024.
14 
As in that paper, we examine the effects of an exogenous increase 
in transfer programs, ζ
t
, equal to one percent of steady-state GDP. 
Here, however, we consider the consequences of alternative degrees 
of persistence of such a disturbance; we assume that the value of 
ζ
t
following the shock is expected to decay at the rate ρt, where the 
coefficient of serial correlation, ρ, is allowed to take values between 
zero (the case shown in the earlier paper) and 0.7.
Figure 2 shows the impulse response of the shock, ζ
t
, for the 
different values of ρ considered. Figure 3 then shows the impulse 
response of the public debt, bt , in response to a pure fiscal shock of this 
kind under the optimal policy, for each of the alternative values of ρ. 
Figure 4 shows the corresponding responses of the tax rate, τ t , under the 
optimal policy, and figure 5 the associated responses of the inflation 
rate. In contrast to the optimal policy in the case of flexible prices 
(discussed further in Benigno and Woodford, 2004), it is optimal to 
respond to a pure fiscal shock of this kind by permanently increasing 
the level of real public debt and planning a corresponding permanent 
14. Here the interest-sensitivity of expenditure and the slope of the Phillips curve 
are calibrated to agree with the econometric estimates of Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997) for the US economy, and the fiscal parameters are calibrated to imply that 
steady-state tax revenues are 20 percent of GDP and that the steady-state public debt 
is 60 percent of annual GDP. The assumed weights on the two stabilization objectives 
in the loss function (9) are the ones that correspond to maximization of expected utility, 
given the parameters of the model, as explained in Benigno and Woodford (2004). Note 
that in our present notation, πt is a quarterly inflation rate; if we instead write the loss 
function in terms of an annualized inflation rate, the relative weight on output-gap 
stabilization would instead be 0.038. This is slightly smaller than the value quoted in 
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), mainly as a consequence of the tax distortions assumed 
here, but abstracted from in that paper.
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increase in the tax rate. (The increase in the level of real public 
debt under the optimal policy is more gradual the more persistent 
the fiscal shock, whereas it was immediate in the case of the purely 
transitory shock considered in our previous paper.) Optimal policy 
does involve some unanticipated inflation at the time of the shock, 
as in the Chari-Kehoe analysis, but it is not nearly large enough 
to completely offset the fiscal stress, which is why future taxes are 
also increased.
Figure 2: Alternative Fiscal Shocks
Source: Authors' computations.
Figure 3: Impulse Response of the Public Debt to a Pure 
Fiscal Shock, for Alternative Degrees of Persistence
Source: Authors' computations.
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Figure 4:  Impulse Response of the Tax Rate to a Pure Fiscal 
Shock, for Alternative Degrees of Persistence
Source: Authors' computations.
Figure 5: Impulse Response of the Inflation Rate to a Pure 
Fiscal Shock, for Alternative Degrees of Persistence
Source: Authors' computations.
As shown in figure 5, the inflationary impact of a fiscal shock 
under the optimal policy regime is quite small. In the case of a purely 
transitory (one-quarter) increase in the size of transfer programs by 
an amount equal to one percent of GDP, optimal policy allows an 
increase in the inflation rate that quarter of only two basis points 
(at an annualized rate).15 Moreover, the increase in inflation is 
15. The log price level is thus allowed to increase that quarter by only half a 
basis point.
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limited to the quarter of the shock. This compares with an increase 
in the inflation rate of nearly two percentage points under the 
optimal policy in the case of flexible prices. This conclusion that 
the optimal inflation response is small does not depend on an 
extreme calibration of the degree of price stickiness. In Benigno 
and Woodford (2004), we show that the optimal response to a purely 
transitory fiscal shock is similarly small even if prices are assumed 
to be much less sticky than under the calibration used here; there 
is a dramatic difference between optimal policy under fully flexible 
prices and under even slightly sticky prices (that is, the short-run 
aggregate supply trade-off is not completely vertical). The optimal 
inflation response is larger if the shock is more persistent, since in 
this case the cumulative cost of the increased transfers—and thus 
the total increase in fiscal stress—is several times as large. Even 
when ρ = 0.7, however, the optimal increase in the inflation rate 
is only about seven basis points. Finally, the effect on inflation is 
purely transitory under optimal policy, regardless of the degree of 
persistence of the fiscal shock itself.
This last conclusion—that variations in inflation should be 
purely transitory under the optimal policy, so that the expected 
rate of inflation never varies at all—is quite robust to the type of 
shock considered. The conclusion follows directly from the first-order 
conditions that characterize optimal policy. Condition (19) implies 
that forecastable variations in the inflation rate should be allowed 
only to the extent that there are forecastable variations in one or 
the other of the Lagrange multipliers. Condition (21) implies that 
there are no forecastable variations in the multiplier associated with 
the solvency constraint, while condition (22) implies that the two 
multipliers should covary perfectly with one another, so that there 
are no forecastable variations in the multiplier associated with the 
aggregate supply constraint either, under an optimal policy.
The fiscal consequences of monetary policy thus matter if 
all sources of government revenue are distorting. This creates 
additional reasons for departures from strict price stability to be 
optimal. It is now optimal for the inflation rate to vary, at least to 
some extent, in response to disturbances (such as a change in the 
size of government transfer programs) that are irrelevant in the 
classic analysis reviewed in the previous section. Even so, optimal 
policy continues to possess important features of an inflation 
targeting regime. The rate of inflation that is forecastable for the 
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future should never vary, regardless of the kind of disturbances 
hitting the economy, and the unforecastable variations in inflation 
that should be allowed are quite small.
It is no longer optimal to target a constant value for the output-
gap-adjusted price level, pt . In fact, the optimal policy now involves 
some degree of base drift in the price level, since the transitory 
inflation shown in figure 5 permanently shifts the price level. 
Nonetheless, optimal monetary policy can be characterized by 
commitment to a target criterion that is only a slight generalization 
of the one presented above for the case of lump-sum taxes. We return 
to this topic in section 6 below.
3.3 Consequences of Additional Fiscal Instruments
The analysis of Benigno and Woodford (2004) assumes that a 
small and quite specific set of policy instruments are available to 
the fiscal authority: the only source of government revenue is a 
proportional sales tax, and the only kind of government debt that 
may be issued is a very short-term (one-period) riskless nominal 
bond. Here we briefly discuss the consequences of allowing for 
additional instruments and, hence, a broader range of possible 
fiscal policies.
Not surprisingly, additional fiscal instruments, if used skillfully 
enough, can allow a better equilibrium to be achieved. This can 
make it simpler to characterize optimal monetary policy, since we no 
longer have to rely on a limited set of instruments to simultaneously 
serve multiple stabilization objectives. Suppose, for example, that 
it is possible to independently vary the level of several different 
types of distorting taxes. With two distinct tax rates, the cost-push 
term, ψτ t , in equation (10) becomes ψ τ ψ τ1 1 2 2 , ,t t+ , while the term 
b tτ τ -
in equation (12) becomes b bt t1 1 2 2τ τ , ,+ . In general, not only will 
there be different elasticities in the case of different taxes, but the 
ratios of the elasticities will not be the same in the two equations; 
the fact that a given percentage increase in one tax rate results in 
a 20 percent larger increase in revenues than that resulting from 
a similar increase in a second tax rate does not imply that it also 
results in a 20 percent larger cost-push effect. The existence of 
multiple taxes that can be independently varied (and are not at 
some boundary value under an optimal policy) thus allows the fiscal 
authority to independently shift the aggregate supply relation and 
affect the government’s budget.
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If this is possible, then a lump-sum tax is essentially possible, as 
some combination of tax increases and decreases will be able to increase 
tax revenues without any net effect on the aggregate supply relation.16 
We are not, however, returning to the classic situation analyzed in 
section 2. This setup actually simplifies matters, for tax policy can now 
be used to offset the cost-push effects of other disturbances, without 
any consequences for government solvency. Constraint (12) therefore 
ceases to bind, as in section 2, but tax policy can be used to shift the 
aggregate supply relation, as in sections 3.1 and 3.2. Optimal policy 
then involves using taxes to offset the cost-push term, ut, entirely 
and then applying monetary policy to completely stabilize both 
inflation and the output gap. (Taxes are also used to ensure that this 
equilibrium is consistent with intertemporal government solvency.) 
In such a case, the optimal monetary policy will be a strict inflation 
target that maintains πt = 0 at all times, regardless of the shocks to 
which the economy may be subject.17
The case for inflation targeting is thus quite strong indeed when 
tax policy can be varied in any of a range of directions and the fiscal 
authority can be expected to exercise its power skillfully. This may not 
be of the greatest practical interest, however. For instance, if the tax 
rates are each required to be nonnegative, then it may be optimal to 
raise all revenue using only one tax—namely, the one with the lowest 
ratio of ψj to bj (and thus with the least distortion created per dollar of 
revenue raised). The optimal policy problem would then end up being 
similar to the one treated above, in which there is assumed to be only 
a single type of distorting tax.
Allowing for the possibility of issuing other forms of government 
debt would also increase the flexibility of fiscal policy and reduce the 
constraints on what monetary policy can achieve. For example, if it 
were possible to issue arbitrary kinds of state-contingent debt, then 
in principle it would be possible to arrange for bt −1 to vary with the 
state that is realized at date t in such a way that b ft t

− +1  never varies, 
regardless of the exogenous disturbances. Complete stabilization of 
both inflation and the output gap would again be possible, and the 
optimal monetary policy would be a strict inflation target of zero. 
16. Here we assume that the various taxes in question affect all sectors of the 
economy identically, as in the presence of both a sales tax and a wage income tax. 
Under this assumption, taxes create no distortions other than the effect indicated by 
the cost-push term in the aggregate supply relation. 
17. Our ability to achieve the first-best outcome with a sufficient number of taxes 
is reminiscent of the conclusion of Correia, Nicolini, and Teles (2003) in the context of 
a model with a different kind of price stickiness.
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However, the supposition that state-contingent payoffs on government 
debt can be arranged with such sophistication is hardly realistic.
One possibility is for countries to use maturity to vary the kind of 
debt that they issue. If government debt does not all mature in one 
period, then bt −1  is no longer a predetermined state variable; instead, 
it depends on the market valuation of bonds in period t, which generally 
depends on the shocks that occur at that date. Since the prices of bonds 
with different maturities respond distinctly to shocks occurring at date t, 
different maturity structures of the public debt will have varying effects 
on the state contingency of bt −1 . With a sufficient number of maturities 
available, it may well be possible once again to bring about the kind of 
state contingency that makes b ft t

− +1  independent of shocks, thereby 
eliminating the need for state-contingent debt, as proposed by Angeletos 
(2001). Both inflation and the output gap can thus be fully stabilized, 
and a strict inflation target would again be the optimal monetary 
policy. To develop these points in more detail, we extend out analysis 
to allow for the existence of longer-maturity nominal government 
debt. In the most general case, the intertemporal budget constraint 
(equation 8) takes the form
E R s E R b
P
Pt t T TT t
t t T t T
t
TT t
, , ,
=
∞
−
−
=
∞
∑ ∑


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
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
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, 
where for any T ≥ t, bt–1,T denotes the real value at time t – 1 of the debt 
that matures at time T. A log-linear approximation can be computed 
as before, yielding
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Here we have defined
b
b b
bt
T t t T T t
T t

−
− − + −
=
∞
=
−∑1 1 1β , , 
where bi is the steady-state real value of i-period debt, and b is the 
steady-state real value of all outstanding government liabilities, 
given by
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b bi i
i
= −
=
∞
∑β 1
1
.
The weights, di, are defined as 
d
b
bi
i
i=
−β 1
for each i ≥ 1. Finally, the composite fiscal stress term, ft, is now 
defined by
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which can be written more compactly as
f E d h E ft t T t
T t
T t
T t
T t
T= ′ + −( ) ′− +
=
∞
−
=
∞
∑ ∑1 1ξ ξξ ξβ β ,                                  (24)
again using the notation defined in Benigno and Woodford (2004).
The planning problem is to find state-contingent paths {πt, yt, τ t} to 
minimize equation (9) subject to constraints (11) and (23). As 
before, the composite disturbance, ft, completely summarizes 
the information at date t about the exogenous disturbances that 
interfere with complete stabilization of inflation and the output gap. 
In contrast to the case of one-period debt, output and inflation can 
now be stabilized at their optimal level even when prices are sticky 
by appropriately choosing the steady-state structure of maturity. 
This is because the stochastic properties of the fiscal stress term 
now depend on the maturity structure. With an appropriate choice 
of the maturity structure, one can even ensure that ft is identically 
equal to zero at all times, in which case complete achievement of 
both stabilization objectives will be possible.
Let government debt have a maximum maturity of N periods and 
let J be the number of stochastic disturbances of the model. Let us 
further suppose (purely for illustrative purposes, for our argument 
could easily be generalized) that the disturbances are all first-order 
autoregressive, or AR(1), processes,
ξ ρ ξ εt
j
j t
j
t
j= +−1 , 
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where εt
j is a white-noise process and |ρj| < 1 for each disturbance j. 
In this case, equation (24) takes the form
f d h ft i
i
N
j
i
j
J
t
j
j t
j
j
J
j j
= + −( ) −( )
= =
−
=
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1 1
1
1
1 1ρ ξ β ρ β ξξ ξ ,
where h
jξ and
 f
jξ are the jth components of the vectors hξ and fξ, 
respectively.
It now follows (generically) that for ft to be zero at all times, it is 
necessary and sufficient that
ρ j
i
i
i
N
jd z
=
∑ =
1
,                                                                                     (25)
where zj is defined by
z h fj j j j= −( ) −( )
− −1 1
1 1β ρ β ξ ξ ,
for each j. Then the set of J equations (25) together with the 
identity 
di
i
N
=
∑ =
1
1 ,                                                                                         (26)
forms a set of J + 1 equations in the N unknowns, {di}. We can write 
this system of linear equations using matrix notation. To this end, 
we define the matrix
A ≡

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

















−
−
−
1
1
1
1 1 1
1 1
1
2 2
1
1
ρ ρ
ρ ρ
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N
N
J J
N

, 
and let z be the vector whose first J elements are the zj, and whose 
final element is 1. We can then write the system of linear equations 
in the compact form,
Ad z= ,                                                                                            (27) 
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where d is the vector of coefficients di. Standard results ensure that 
there is a solution of equation (27) as long as A is of full rank. In this 
case, there is at least one vector d—that is, at least one steady-state 
maturity structure—such that ft = 0, so that complete stabilization of 
both inflation and the output gap can be achieved.
In particular, if N = J + 1, there is exactly one solution for any 
given z, when A is of full rank. For example, in the case of a single 
stochastic disturbance (J = 1), the matrix A is always of full rank, and 
the first-best outcome can be achieved simply by issuing nominal debt 
with one- and two-period maturities. The optimal maturity structure 
in this case depends on the persistence of the shock, as well as on its 
contribution to movements in the fiscal stress measure, ft. If J > 1, A 
is of full rank if and only if ρi ≠ ρj for each i and j. (Otherwise there 
generally is no solution.) 
Angeletos (2001) shows in a flexible-price model that to complete 
the markets, it is necessary and sufficient to issue nominal debt that 
has at least N-period maturity, where N is the number of states of 
nature in the model. Here we establish that in a log-linear model, 
what matters is not the number of distinct states of nature, but only 
the number of stochastic disturbances, as Angeletos conjectured on 
the basis of his numerical results. As long as debt can be issued in 
moderately long maturities, it will generally be possible, at least in 
principle, to choose a maturity structure that achieves the first-best 
outcome. The optimal monetary policy will simply aim at complete 
price stability, while the distorting tax rate will be used to offset 
cost-push disturbances, so that zero inflation is compatible with a 
zero output gap.
As Buera and Nicolini (2004) note in a related context, however, the 
maturity structure required for such an outcome may be implausible, 
involving very large long and short positions in different maturities. 
They also show that the optimal maturity structure may be extremely 
sensitive to small changes in model parameters, such as small changes 
in the serial correlation of disturbance processes.18 Here again, while in 
principle the opportunity to increase the flexibility of fiscal policy in this 
way can greatly facilitate monetary stabilization policy, the practical 
relevance of this case is open to question. We accordingly restrict the 
remainder of our analysis to the case of a single maturity of government 
debt, specifically, one very short-term (single-period) debt. In fact, most 
18. This can be seen from our analysis above, since a small change in these 
parameters can cause the rank condition to fail. 
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countries with serious fiscal imbalances issue almost exclusively short-
maturity debt, so our assumption seems likely to represent the most 
relevant case for the countries facing the concerns addressed in this 
paper. This emphasis is also consistent with our desire to consider the 
cases in which possible constraints on fiscal policy are most likely to 
create problems for inflation targeting. The presence of a larger number 
of fiscal instruments, or fewer constraints on how they are used, will 
generally strengthen the case for inflation targeting. Our interest, 
however, is in the extent to which a form of inflation targeting continues 
to be desirable even when fiscal policy is much less helpful.
4. OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WHEN FISCAL POLICY IS 
EXOGENOUS
This section explores a still more constrained case, in which 
{Gt, ζt, τt} are all assumed to be exogenous processes, determined by 
political factors that the central bank cannot influence. This is the type 
of fiscal policy assumed by Loyo (1999), which Sims (2005) uses in his 
critique of inflation targeting. In a flexible-price model such as Loyo’s, 
this policy implies a purely exogenous evolution of the real primary 
government budget surplus, {st}. The central bank must beware that a 
tight-money policy does not cause explosive growth of the public debt, 
for it is assumed that neither taxes nor government spending will be 
adjusted to prevent such dynamics.
In this case, the intertemporal solvency condition (equation 12) 
constrains the possible paths for inflation and output that can be achieved 
by any monetary policy, and no endogenous fiscal instruments are 
available to adjust this constraint. At the same time, the possible paths 
for inflation and output are constrained by the aggregate supply trade-
off (equation 11), and there is no endogenous fiscal instrument that can 
shift this relation either, in contrast with the assumption in the previous 
section. The central bank’s ability to achieve its inflation and output-gap 
stabilization objectives is accordingly more tightly constrained.
As Sims (2005) notes, full price stability (or even complete 
stabilization of the inflation rate at some nonzero value) will typically 
be infeasible under these assumptions—unlike the situation considered 
in the previous section, where this is a possible, though not quite 
optimal, monetary policy. Condition (11) allows us to easily derive the 
unique output-gap process consistent with complete stabilization of the 
inflation rate. However, the process {yt} obtained in this way (together 
with the assumed constant inflation rate and the exogenously given 
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tax process) will almost surely not satisfy the intertemporal solvency 
condition (equation 12) for all possible realizations of the disturbances 
that affect the fiscal stress term, ft. This does not mean that monetary 
policy is powerless to stabilize either nominal or real variables. While 
one cannot commit to completely stable inflation both immediately and 
for the indefinite future, policymakers can choose among alternative 
paths for inflation, some of which involve inflationary spirals of the 
sort modeled by Loyo, and others of which involve a fairly quick return 
to price stability. Here we consider the central bank’s optimal choice 
among the set of possible equilibria, given the constraints implied by 
exogenous fiscal policy.
The optimization problem in this case is to find paths, {πt, yt}, that 
minimize equation (9) subject to the constraints in equations (11) and 
(12), in which we now treat { τ t } as another exogenous disturbance 
process. The first-order conditions for this optimization problem are the 
same as before (conditions 19–21). The only difference is that condition 
(22) need no longer hold (as the tax rate need not be chosen optimally); 
this condition is replaced by the exogenously given process, { τ t }.
Optimal state-contingent responses to exogenous disturbances of 
various types can easily be derived in this case, using the same methods 
as in the previous section. For purposes of illustration, we again consider 
a pure fiscal shock, by which we mean an exogenous increase in the size 
Figure 6: Impulse Response of the Public Debt under 
Optimal Monetary Policy and Two Assumptions about 
Tax Policya
a. The figure shows the impulse response of the real public debt to a pure fiscal shock under optimal monetary 
policy, both under the assumption that tax policy also responds optimally (solid line; same as in figure 3) and under 
the assumption that the path of the tax rate does not respond at all (dashed line). 
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Figure 7: Impulse Response of the Inflation Rate under 
Optimal Monetary Policy and Two Assumptions about 
Tax Policya
a. The figure shows the impulse response of the real public debt to a pure fiscal shock under optimal monetary 
policy, both under the assumption that tax policy also responds optimally (solid line; same as in figure 3) and under 
the assumption that the path of the tax rate does not respond at all (dashed line). 
of government transfer programs. To simplify our figures, we present 
results only for the case of ρ = 0.7. Figure 6 shows the impulse response 
of the real public debt to such a shock under optimal monetary policy, 
both under the assumption that tax policy also responds optimally (as 
in the previous section) and under the assumption that the path of the 
tax rate does not respond at all. Figure 7 shows the impulse response 
of the inflation rate under optimal monetary policy, under the same 
two alternative assumptions about fiscal policy.
As figure 7 indicates, the degree to which it is optimal to allow 
a fiscal shock to affect the inflation rate is much greater when tax 
policy cannot be expected to adjust in response to the shock. The 
optimal immediate effect on the inflation rate is about eight times as 
large, in our calibrated example, under the exogenously given path 
for the tax rate; it is also slightly more persistent, so the inflation rate 
expected over the next few quarters should be allowed to rise slightly 
in response to such a shock. The larger immediate increase in inflation 
means that the reduction of the real burden of the public debt through 
unexpected inflation plays a bigger role in offsetting the fiscal stress 
in this case. This is necessary because under the assumption of an 
exogenous path of taxes, the long-run level of the real public debt 
cannot be increased (as would occur under the optimal fiscal policy); 
instead, it must continue to equal the unique level consistent with 
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intertemporal solvency given the expected long-run tax rate. As shown 
in figure 6, the level of the real public debt must fall, rather than rise, 
in response to the fiscal shock so that it can approach its unchanged 
long-run level from below. (The real public debt must be expected to 
grow over the quarters in which the size of transfer programs is still 
temporarily high, but this is no longer a surprise.) This can occur 
only through a sufficiently large surprise increase in inflation in the 
quarter in which the shock occurs, just as under the optimal policy for 
the flexible-price economy analyzed by Chari and Kehoe (1999).
Even under this extreme assumption about the nonresponsiveness 
of tax policy, an optimal monetary policy does not involve too great an 
increase in inflation in response to a disturbance that increases fiscal 
stress. In the case of the shock considered in figure 7, the cumulative 
increase in the price level is still only about a quarter of a percentage 
point, whereas the price increase under optimal policy for the flexible-
price economy would be about six times as large. Even when tax 
increases do not contribute to relieving fiscal stress at all, less inflation 
is required to maintain intertemporal solvency in the case of a sticky-
price economy, because inflationary policy stimulates real activity. 
The resulting higher real incomes imply higher tax revenues, which 
contribute substantially to government solvency in the equilibrium 
shown by the dashed lines in figures 6 and 7.
This illustrates an important benefit of an appropriately managed 
inflation-targeting regime, even when fiscal policy is purely exogenous, 
as in the pessimistic case considered by Sims (2005). The central 
bank is able to maintain intertemporal solvency without too much 
inflation in our example precisely because inflationary expectations 
are contained even while transitory inflation is allowed to erode the 
real value of existing nominal claims on the government. If expected 
inflation does not increase much at the time of the fiscal shock, the 
aggregate supply trade-off (equation 11) implies a relatively large 
increase in real output for a given increase in the current inflation 
rate, so a substantial improvement in government solvency can be 
obtained without too much inflation. If, instead, the expected future 
inflation rate were to rise as much as the current inflation rate (or 
even more), the increase in real activity resulting from inflationary 
monetary policy would be tiny or nonexistent—or even of the opposite 
sign. In that case, tax revenues would increase little if at all, and all of 
the fiscal stress would have to be offset through a reduction in the real 
value of the public debt owing to unexpected inflation; the required 
immediate increase in inflation would then be many times larger.
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We can illustrate this trade-off quantitatively by considering 
alternative responses to a disturbance to the fiscal stress.19 Suppose 
that in response to such a shock in period t, monetary policy allows 
the path of inflation to change in such a way that
E Et t j t t j t
jπ π π λ+ − +− =1  ,
for all j ≥ 0, for some initial inflation response, πt , and some 
persistence factor, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. In addition, suppose for simplicity that 
the disturbance does not change the expected path of the tax gap, 20
Et t j t jτ τ + +−






* . 
For any choice of λ, there exists a unique value of πt (given the size 
of the shock at date t) such that this represents a possible equilibrium 
response under a suitable monetary policy. We can then consider how 
πt —and hence the entire path of the inflation response—varies with 
the choice of λ.
Solving equation (11) for the implied response of the output gap, 
we find that
E y E yt t j t t j t
j
+ − +− =
−
1
1 βλ
κ
π λ ,
for each j ≥ 0. Substituting this and the conjectured inflation response 
into the intertemporal solvency condition (equation 12), we find that 
the condition is satisfied if and only if


π
σ βλ β κt
t
y
f
b
=
+ −( )+ −( )−1 1 11
.                                                    (28)
This indicates how the initial effect on inflation relates to the 
expected degree of persistence of the shock’s effect on the inflation rate. 
19. This might be the pure fiscal shock considered in the numerical examples 
presented, but it might also be any other kind of exogenous disturbance that affects 
the term ft.
20. If the path of the tax gap also changes, a derivation like the one sketched below 
is again possible, except that in the numerator of equation (28), instead of ft , one has ft  
plus a multiple of the present value of changes in the expected tax gap. The conclusions 
obtained below on how πt depends on the value of λ continue to apply.
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A higher value of λ makes the denominator of equation (28) a smaller 
positive quantity, meaning that πt must be larger. Thus a policy that 
makes the shock’s effect on inflation more persistent will involve a 
larger initial effect on inflation, as well as (a fortiori) a larger effect 
on inflation at all later dates.
Even under the constraints assumed in this section, the central 
bank should credibly commit itself to restoring low inflation 
relatively soon after a disturbance that creates fiscal stress. This 
requires both that monetary policy be clearly focused on inflation 
control and that the central bank’s commitment to an essentially 
constant medium-term inflation target be unwavering, even when 
fiscal stress requires a short-run departure from the medium-
term target. The credibility of such a commitment will be greater to 
the extent that the central bank is able to explain why the size of 
departure that is currently occurring is consistent with the principles 
to which it is committed, rather than representing an abrogation of 
those principles or a concession that they are frequently inapplicable. 
We next consider the formulation of a more flexible form of target 
criterion that would be suitable for this purpose.
5. AN OPTIMAL TARGETING RULE FOR MONETARY POLICY 
We have argued that even in the case of severe constraints on the 
degree to which an optimal adjustment of tax policy can be expected, 
an optimal monetary policy will involve a commitment not to allow 
temporary increases in inflation to persist, so that medium-term 
inflation expectations remain well anchored. This raises the question 
of what kind of commitment regarding the future conduct of 
monetary policy would serve this purpose, without appearing to 
promise different conduct in the future than what is exhibited in 
the present—a promise that would not easily be made credible. The 
answer, in our view, is that monetary policy should be conducted 
in such a way as to seek at all times to conform to an appropriately 
formulated target criterion. The target criterion should both explain 
how much inflation can be allowed in the short run, in response to a 
given type and size of disturbance, and guarantee (if it is expected 
to be followed in the future, as well) that no significant fluctuations 
in the inflation rate should be forecasted more than a few quarters 
into the future.
To identify a criterion that will serve this purpose under each of 
the assumptions about the fiscal regime considered above and for all 
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the different types of disturbances that might affect the economy, we 
use the method illustrated in section 2—that is, we use the first-order 
conditions that characterize optimal policy to derive a target criterion 
that must be satisfied in an optimal equilibrium.21 Conditions (19)–(21) 
must hold if monetary policy is optimal, under all the fiscal regimes 
considered thus far.22 Consequently, a target criterion that follows 
from (and, in turn, guarantees) these conditions will be a criterion 
for the optimality of monetary policy that will generally be useful. 
Since the first-order conditions also apply regardless of the nature 
of the (additive) exogenous disturbances that may perturb the model 
structural relations, the resulting criterion is also robust to alternative 
assumptions about the statistical properties of the disturbances, as 
stressed by Giannoni and Woodford (2002).
A robustly optimal target criterion that is equivalent to 
demanding the existence of Lagrange multiplier processes {ϕ1t, ϕ2t} 
that satisfy equations (19)–(21) can be formulated as follows. As in 
the simpler case treated in section 2, optimal policy can be described 
in terms of commitment to a target for the output-gap-adjusted price 
level, pt , defined in equation (16). The central bank should use its 
policy instrument to ensure that each period, pt satisfies
p p p pt t t t= + +( ) −( )− −1 11
* * *η ,                                                           (29)
where
η σ
β κ
≡
−( ) +
>
−1
1
0
by
and pt* is the central bank’s estimate (conditional on information at 
t) of the long-run (output-gap-adjusted) price level consistent with 
intertemporal government solvency. 
Implementation of policy in accordance with this criterion would 
require the central bank to estimate the current value of the long-run 
price-level target, pt*, as part of each decision cycle. This would be 
determined, in principle, as follows. Equation (29) implies that
21. Further details of the derivation are given in Benigno and Woodford (2005b), 
where we also discuss the form of targeting rule that is appropriate under a broader 
class of possible assumptions about fiscal policy.
22. These conditions also hold in the case of lump-sum taxes, as assumed in section 2, 
but with the additional condition that ϕ2t = 0 at all times, which allows the first-order 
conditions to be reduced to the system of equations (14) and (15).
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E p pt T t =
* ,
for all T ≥ t + 1. A value for pt* thus implies not just a value for pt, but 
a complete expected path, { E pt T }, for all T ≥ t. The central bank’s 
model of the economy—including its model of the behavior of the 
fiscal authority—can then be used to derive the implied forecast 
paths for the other endogenous variables corresponding to a given 
current estimate of pt*. The right estimate of pt* is then the one 
that leads to a set of forecast paths consistent with intertemporal 
government solvency. 
The degree to which pt* will be found to increase in response to a 
given disturbance depends on the nature of the fiscal regime. Figure 8 
shows the optimal responses of the path of the output-gap-adjusted 
price level for both an endogenous (optimal) and an exogenous path for 
the tax rate, for the same kind of real disturbance as in figures 6 and 7. 
In both cases, the shape of the optimal response of this variable is the 
same; the response is simply scaled in proportion to the different-sized 
jump in the long-run price level.23
The same would be true if we were to plot optimal responses to 
other types of exogenous disturbances, or if we assumed a different 
23. The same is true when the tax rate is predetermined for a certain period of time, 
after which it adjusts optimally (see Benigno and Woodford, 2005b). In such a case, the 
size of the response is intermediate between the two cases shown in figure 8. 
Figure 8: Optimal Response of the Output-Gap-Adjusted 
Price Level under the Two Polar Assumptions about 
Fiscal Policy
Source: Authors' computations.
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degree of persistence of the disturbance; this is the feature of optimal 
policy that allows such a simple target criterion to provide a robust 
guide for policy. The same kind of criterion also applies in the case of 
lump-sum taxes, as assumed in section 2. In this case, however, there 
is never any need to vary the long-run price-level target to ensure 
solvency, so equation (29) applies with pt* equal to a constant p*.
Implementing this kind of targeting procedure requires the central 
bank to make projections not only of the future evolution of prices 
and real activity, but also of the evolution of the government finances 
and the public debt, so as to evaluate the consistency of alternative 
monetary policies with intertemporal government solvency. Some may 
fear that this sounds like a prescription for exactly the sort of fiscal 
dominance of monetary policy against which Fraga, Goldfajn, and 
Minella (2004) warn. It is true that we have described a regime under 
which monetary policy could be conducted in a constrained-optimal 
way, even if the fiscal authority were understood to be completely 
unwilling ever to adjust fiscal instruments to maintain intertemporal 
solvency. However, the knowledge that the central bank reasons in 
this way should not provide an incentive for the fiscal authority to be 
profligate, relying on the central bank to adjust monetary policy as 
necessary to accommodate any degree of spending. Under the regime 
proposed here, the central bank would make its own judgment 
regarding the degree of fiscal adjustment that could properly be 
expected, given the constraints under which fiscal policy is expected 
to be determined, and then target a path for the output-gap-adjusted 
price level accordingly. It would be appropriate for the central bank 
to publicize the projections that serve as the basis for this decision. 
Among other things, this would inform the fiscal authority of the 
degree of eventual revenue increases expected by the central bank, 
which will be necessary to maintain intertemporal solvency given the 
central bank’s target path for the gap-adjusted price level.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The nature of fiscal policy has important consequences for the 
optimal conduct of monetary policy, for two reasons. On the one hand, 
monetary policy has consequences for the intertemporal solvency of 
the government under a given fiscal policy, so a change in monetary 
policy can require corresponding changes in fiscal policy, which will 
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have welfare consequences if all sources of government revenue are 
distorting. On the other hand, fiscal policy decisions generally have 
supply-side consequences that affect the available trade-off between 
inflation stabilization and the central bank’s ability to stabilize 
the welfare-relevant output gap. Hence, alternative assumptions 
about the set of instruments available to the fiscal authority and 
the flexibility and accuracy with which they will be adjusted can 
greatly change the complexity of the challenges involved in monetary 
stabilization policy.
Nonetheless, we have argued that it is possible to prescribe an 
optimal approach to the conduct of monetary policy that is applicable 
to a range of different assumptions regarding fiscal institutions and 
the character of fiscal policy. The problem of monetary stabilization 
policy is likely to be more complex, under realistic assumptions about 
fiscal policy, than in familiar analyses that abstract altogether from 
interactions between monetary and fiscal policy decisions. We found, 
however, that even under considerably more general assumptions, an 
optimal monetary policy has important aspects of a flexible inflation-
targeting regime.
Under all of the regimes considered, optimal monetary policy can 
be implemented through a commitment to use policy to guarantee 
fulfillment of a target criterion, which specifies the acceptable 
level of an output-gap-adjusted price level given the central bank’s 
current projections of the economy’s possible future evolution. A 
credible commitment to such a rule should serve to anchor inflation 
expectations. As we have seen, commitment to the target criterion 
implies that there should be no forecastable variation in the growth 
rate of the output-gap-adjusted price level over any horizons beginning 
a quarter or further in the future. This means that any variations in 
the inflation forecast must be fully justifiable in terms of the projected 
change in the output gap over the same horizon. Moreover, since 
forecastable changes in the output gap over periods more than a few 
quarters in the future will always be negligible, this implies that 
medium-term inflation forecasts must essentially be constant.
Thus an important feature of an optimal policy commitment is 
a credible commitment by the central bank to return inflation to its 
long-run target level fairly promptly after any unforeseen disturbance 
that justifies a temporary departure from that target. When the set 
of available fiscal instruments is fairly constrained, it is important 
to allow for temporary variations in the inflation rate in response to 
exogenous disturbances, and disturbances that affect the economy 
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mainly through their impact on the government budget are among 
the types of disturbances that should be allowed to have a transitory 
effect on the inflation rate. Nevertheless, even while the central bank 
allows such disturbances to affect the current rate of inflation (and its 
current target for the gap-adjusted price level), it should stress the 
fact that the size of the one-time effect on prices is calculated to be 
consistent with a prompt stabilization of prices. The development of 
an explicit calculus that can be used to justify temporary departures 
from the inflation target, which would have been maintained in the 
absence of the shock, is an important project for adapting the practice 
of inflation targeting to the circumstances of countries with frequent 
and urgent fiscal imbalances.
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